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Ontology is a burgeoning field, involving researchers 
from the computer science, philosophy, data and 
software engineering, logic, linguistics, and 
terminology domains. Many ontology-related terms 
with precise meanings in one of these domains have 
different meanings in others. Our purpose here is to 
initiate a path towards disambiguation of such terms. 
We draw primarily on the literature of biomedical 
informatics, not least because the problems caused 
by unclear or ambiguous use of terms have been 
there most thoroughly addressed. We advance a 
proposal resting on a distinction of three levels too 
often run together in biomedical ontology research: 
1. the level of reality; 2. the level of cognitive 
representations of this reality; 3. the level of textual 
and graphical artifacts. We propose a reference 
terminology for ontology research and development 
that is designed to serve as common hub into which 
the several competing disciplinary terminologies can 
be mapped. We then justify our terminological 
choices through a critical treatment of the ‘concept 
orientation’ in biomedical terminology research. 
PREAMBLE 
Ever since the invention of the computer, scientists 
and engineers have been exploring ways of 
‘modeling’ or ‘representing’ the entities about which 
machines are expected to reason. But what do 
‘modeling’ and ‘representing’ mean? What is a 
‘conceptual model’ or an ‘information model’ and 
how can they and their components be 
unambiguously described?  
Two questions here arise: To what do expressions 
such as ‘concept’, ‘information’, ‘knowledge’, etc. 
precisely refer? And what is it to ‘model’ or 
‘represent’ such things? If information and 
knowledge themselves consist in representations, then 
what could an information representation or a 
knowledge representation be? There is, to say the 
least, some suspicion of redundancy here. 
As we have argued elsewhere, the term ‘concept’ is 
marked in a peculiarly conspicuous manner by 
problems in this regard.1 But the problem of multiple 
conflicting meanings arises also in regard to other 
terms, such as ‘class’, ‘object’, ‘instance’, 
‘individual’, ‘property’, ‘relation’, etc., all of which 
have established, but unfortunately non-uniform, 
meanings in a range of different disciplines.  
Among philosophical ontologists, the term 
‘instance’ means an individual (for example this 
particular dog Fido), which is an instance of a 
corresponding universal or kind (dog, mammal, etc.). 
In OWL, ‘instance’ means ‘element’ or ‘member’ of a 
class (where ‘class’ means ‘general concept, category 
or classification … that belongs to the class extension 
of owl:Class’2).  
Standardization agencies such as ISO, CEN and 
W3C have been of little help in engendering cross-
disciplinary uniformity in the use of such terms, since 
their standards are themselves directed towards 
specific communities. Standardization efforts under 
the auspices of W3C or UML or Dublin Core, too, 
have not addressed these problems. For while OWL-
DL, for example, has a rigorously defined semantics,3 
this does not by any means guarantee that an ontology 
formulated using OWL-DL is an error-free 
representation of its intended domain, and nor – until 
the day when the use of OWL or of some successor 
becomes uniform common practice – will it do 
anything to resolve the problems of semantic 
ambiguity adverted to in the above. 
In the domain of biomedical informatics a number 
of attempts have been made to resolve these 
problems4,5,6 in light of an increasing recognition that 
many ambitious terminological systems developed in 
this field are marked by unclarity over what, 
precisely, they have been designed to achieve. Are 
biomedical controlled vocabularies ‘concept 
representations’ or ‘knowledge models’? And if they 
are either of these things, how, if at all, do they relate 
to the reality – the tumors, diseases, treatments, 
chemical interactions – on the side of the patient? 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
The purpose of this communication is to initiate a 
process for resolving such problems by drawing on 
the best practices in ontology which are now 
beginning to take root through the efforts of 
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organizations such as the National Center for 
Biomedical Ontology,7 the Open Biomedical Onto-
logies (OBO) Consortium,8 the OBO Foundry,9 and 
others.10 
What is needed is a set of terms referring in 
unambiguous fashion to the different kinds of entities 
surveyed above, which can serve as common target 
for mappings from other discipline- and 
computational idiom-centric terminologies, thereby 
mediating efficient pairwise translations between 
these terminologies themselves.  
Our strategy is to advance precision via clear 
informal definitions rooted in what we assume are 
commonly accepted intuitions, providing references 
to associated formal treatments where possible. In 
selecting terms we have sometimes chosen 
expressions precisely because they have not been 
used by others and hence do not have established 
(and potentially conflicting) meanings. In other cases 
we have adapted existing terms to our purposes by 
providing them with more precise definitions or (in 
case of primitive terms) elucidations.  
These proposals are focused primarily on the 
ontology-related needs of natural science, including 
the clinical basic sciences, though we believe them to 
be of quite general applicability. 
We start out from a distinction of three levels of 
entities which have a role to play wherever ontologies 
are used:  
• Level 1: the objects, processes, qualities, states, 
etc. in reality (for example on the side of the patient);  
• Level 2: cognitive representations of this reality on 
the part of researchers and others; 
• Level 3: concretizations of these cognitive 
representations in (for example textual or graphical) 
representational artifacts. 
This tripartite distinction will awaken echoes of the 
Semantic Triangle of Ogden and Richards, to which 
we return in the sequel. For present purposes we note 
that the indispensability of Level 1 reflects the fact 
that even those who see themselves as building for 
example ‘data models’ in the domain of the life 
sciences are attempting to create thereby artifacts 
which stand in some representational relation to 
entities in the real world. Level 2 reflects the fact that 
a crucial role is played in ontology and terminology 
development by the cognitive representations of 
human subjects. Level 3 reflects the fact that 
cognitive representations can be shared, and serve 
scientific ends, only when they are made 
communicable in a form whereby they can also be 
subjected to criticism and correction, and also to 
implementation in software. 
Note that the three levels overlap; thus the textual 
and graphical artifacts distinguished in Level 3 are 
themselves objects on Level 1. Our talk of ‘levels’ 
should thus be interpreted by analogy with talk of 
‘levels of granularity’: if we have apprehended all the 
liquid in a vessel, then in a sense we have thereby 
apprehended also all the molecules. Yet for scientific 
purposes molecules and liquids must be distinguished 
nonetheless, and the same applies, for the purposes of 
clarity in our thinking about ontologies, to the three 
levels delineated in the above.  
FOUNDATIONS 
Here we give precise definitions to a number of 
central terms, which will then be used in conformity 
thereto in the remainder of the paper. Really existing 
ontologies and related artifacts are typically 
constructed to realize a mixture of different sorts of 
ends (terminologies, for example, to support clinical 
record keeping and large-scale epidemiological 
studies, and to serve as controlled vocabularies for 
the expression of research results). Hence they 
typically combine the features of artifacts of different 
basic types. Our reference terminology is designed to 
reflect these basic types. Hence the definitions we 
propose for terms such as ‘ontology’ or ‘class’ do not 
imply any claim to the effect that everything called an 
‘ontology’ or ‘class’ in the literature exhibits just the 
characteristics referred to in the definition.. 
An ENTITY is anything which exists, including 
objects, processes, qualities and states on all three 
levels (thus also including representations, models, 
beliefs, utterances, documents, observations, etc.)  
A REPRESENTATION is for example an idea, image, 
record, or description which refers to (is of  or about), 
or is intended to refer to, some entity or entities 
external to the representation. Note that a 
representation (e.g. a description such as ‘the cat over 
there on the mat’) can be of or about a given entity 
even though it leaves out many aspects of its target. A 
COMPOSITE REPRESENTATION is a representation 
built out of constituent sub-representations as their 
parts, in the way in which paragraphs are built out of 
sentences and sentences out of words. The smallest 
constituent sub-representations are called 
REPRESENTATIONAL UNITS; examples are: icons, 
names, simple word forms, or the sorts of 
alphanumeric identifiers we might find in patient 
records. Note that many images are not composite 
representations since they are not built out of smallest 
representational units in the way in which molecules 
are built out of atoms. (Pixels are not representational 
units in the sense defined.) 
If we take the graph-theoretic concretization of the 
Gene Ontology11 as our example, then the 
representational units here are the nodes of the graph 
(taken to comprehend terms and unique IDs), which 
are intended to refer to corresponding entities in 
reality. But the composite representation refers, 
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through its graph structure, also to the relations 
between these entities, so that there is reference to 
entities in reality both at the level of single units and 
at the structural level.12  
A COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION (Level 2) is a 
representation whose representational units are ideas, 
thoughts, or beliefs in the mind of some cognitive 
subject – for example a clinician engaged in applying 
theoretical (and practical) knowledge to the task of 
establishing a diagnosis.  
A REPRESENTATIONAL ARTIFACT (Level 3) is a 
representation that is fixed in some medium in such a 
way that it can serve to make the cognitive 
representations existing in the minds of separate 
subjects publicly accessible in some enduring fashion. 
Examples are: a text, a diagram, a map legend, a list, 
a clinical record, or a controlled vocabulary. Clearly 
such artifacts can serve to convey more or less 
adequately the underlying cognitive representations –
and can be correspondingly more or less intuitive or 
understandable. 
Because representational artifacts such as 
SNOMED CT give textual form to cognitive 
representations which pre-exist them, some have 
taken this to mean that these artifacts are in fact made 
up of representations which refer to (are of or about) 
these cognitive representations (the ‘concepts’) from 
out of which the latter are held to be composed.  
We shall argue below that this reflects a deep 
confusion, and that the constituent units of 
representational artifacts developed for scientific 
purposes should more properly (and more 
straightforwardly) be seen as referring to the very 
same entities in reality – the diseases, patients, body 
parts, and so forth – to which the underlying cognitive 
representations of clinicians and others refer. Such 
artifacts are in this respect no different from scientific 
textbooks. They are windows on reality, designed to 
serve as a means by which representations of reality 
on the part of cognitive agents can be made available 
to other agents, both human and machine. A simple 
phrase, such as ‘the cat over there on the mat’, can be 
used to refer more or less successfully to what is, in 
reality, a portion of reality of a highly complex sort – 
and the same applies to all of the types of artifacts 
referred to above. The window on reality which each 
provides is, to be sure, in every case from a certain 
perspective and in such a way as to embody a certain 
granularity of focus. Yet the entities to which it refers 
are full-fledged entities in reality nonetheless – the 
very same, full-fledged entities in reality with which 
we are familiar also in other ways, for example 
because they provide us with food or companionship. 
REALITY 
The clinician is concerned first and foremost with 
PARTICULARS in reality (Level 1), (in the vernacular 
also called ‘tokens’ or ‘individuals’), that is to say 
with individual patients, their lesions, diseases, and 
bodily reactions, divided into CONTINUANTS and 
OCCURRENTS.13 Some particulars, such as human 
beings, planets, ships, hurricanes, receive PROPER 
NAMES (they may also receive unique identifiers, such 
as social security numbers) which are used in 
representational artifacts of various sorts. But we can 
refer to particulars also by means of complex 
expressions – that man on the bench, this 
oophorectomy, this blood sample – involving 
GENERAL TERMS of different sorts, including:  
i. General terms such as ‘apoptosis’, ‘fracture’, 
‘cat’, which represent structures or characteristics in 
reality which are exemplified – the very same 
structures or characteristics; over and over again – in 
an open-ended collection of particulars in arbitrarily 
disconnected regions of space and time. Consider for 
example the way in which a certain DNA structure is 
instantiated as a transcript (RNA-structure) over and 
over again in cells of our body.  
ii. General terms such as ‘danger’, ‘gift’, ‘surprise’, 
which draw together entities in reality which share 
common characteristics which are not intrinsic to the 
entities in question. 
iii. General terms such as ‘Berliner’, ‘Paleolithic’, 
which relate to specific collections of particulars tied 
to specific regions of space and time. 
General terms of the first sort refer to UNIVERSALS 
(in the vernacular also called ‘types’ or ‘kinds’). A 
universal is something that is shared in common by 
all those particulars which are its INSTANCES. The 
universal itself then exists in Level 1 reality as a 
result of existing in its particular instances. When a 
clinician says ‘A and B have the same disease’, she is 
referring to the universal; when she says ‘A’s diabetes 
is more advanced than B’s,’ then she is referring to 
the respective instances. 
It is overwhelmingly universals which are the 
entities represented in scientific texts, and a good 
prima facie indication that a general term ‘A’ refers to 
a universal is that ‘A’ is used by scientists for 
purposes of classificiation and to make different sorts 
of law-like assertions about the individual instances 
of A with which they work in the lab or clinic.  
 
<universal, universal> nose part_of body 
<particular, particular> Mary’s nose part_of Mary  
<particular, universal> Mary’s nose instance_of nose 
Table 1 – Three Basic Sorts of Binary Relation 
Both particulars and universals stand to each other 
in various RELATIONS. Thus particulars stand to the 
corresponding universals in the relation of 
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INSTANTIATION. This and other binary relations (of 
parthood, adjacency, derivation) used in biomedical 
ontologies13 can be divided into groups as in Table 1, 
which uses Roman for particulars, bold type for 
relations involving particulars, and italics for 
universals and for relations between universals. 
A COLLECTION OF PARTICULARS (of molecules in 
John’s body, of pieces of equipment in a certain 
operating theater, of operations performed in this 
theater over a given period of months) is a Level 1 
particular comprehending other particulars as its 
MEMBERS.14 We note that confusion is spawned by 
the fact that we can use the very same general terms 
to refer both to universals and to collections of 
particulars. Consider: 
• HIV is an infectious retrovirus 
• HIV is spreading very rapidly through Asia  
A CLASS is a collection of all and only the particulars 
to which a given general term applies. Where the 
general term in question refers to a universal, then the 
corresponding class, called the EXTENSION of the 
universal (at a given time), comprehends all and only 
those particulars which as a matter of fact instantiate 
the corresponding universal (at that time).  
The totality of classes is wider than the totality of 
extensions of universals since it includes also 
DEFINED CLASSES, designated by terms like 
‘employee of Swedish bank’, ‘daughter of Finnish 
spy’. Languages like OWL are ideally suited to the 
formal treatment of such classes, and the popularity 
of OWL has encouraged the view that it is classes 
which are designated by the general terms in 
terminologies. (OWL classes are not, however, 
identical with classes in the usual set-theoretic sense 
on which we draw also here.) 
Some OWL classes (above all Thing and Nothing) 
are ‘primitive’ (which means: not defined), and these 
classes are sometimes asserted to constitute an OWL 
counterpart of universals (‘natural kinds’) in the sense 
here defined.15 Because OWL identifies the relation 
of instantiation with that of membership, however, it 
in effect identifies universals with their extensions. 
Through relations of greater and lesser generality 
both classes and universals are organized into trees, 
the former on the basis of the subclass relation, the 
latter on the basis of the is_a relation (whereby, 
again, in the OWL framework the two relations are 
identified). Because the instances of more specific 
universals are ipso facto also instances of the 
corresponding more general universals, the latter 
hierarchy is, when viewed extensionally, a proper part 
of the former. As we shall discuss further in our 
treatment of the argument from borderline cases 
below, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between 
terms designating universals and those designating 
defined classes. This does not mean, however, that 
the distinction is of no import. Indeed we believe that 
taking account of this distinction is indispensable to 
creating an path to improvement of ontologies.16 
We use the term PORTION OF REALITY to 
comprehend both single universals and particulars 
and their more or less complex combinations. Some 
portions of reality – for example single organisms, 
planets – reflect autonomous joints of reality (that is, 
they would exist as separate entities even in a world 
denuded of cognitive subjects). Other portions of 
reality are products of fiat demarcations of one or 
other sort,17 as when we delineate a portion of reality 
by focusing on some specific granular level (of 
molecules, or molecular processes), or on some 
specific family of universals (for example when we 
view the human beings living in a given county in 
light of their patterns of alcohol consumption).  
A DOMAIN is a portion of reality that forms the 
subject-matter of a single science or technology or 
mode of study; for example the domain of 
proteomics, of radiology, of viral infections in mouse. 
Representational artifacts will standardly represent 
entities in domains delineated by level of granularity. 
Thus entities smaller than a given threshold value 
may be excluded from a domain because they are not 
salient to the associated scientific or clinical 
purposes.18  
REPRESENTATIONAL ARTIFACTS 
In developing theories, biomedical researchers seek 
representations of the universals existing in their 
respective domain of reality. They first develop 
cognitive representations, which they then transform 
incrementally into representational artifacts of various 
sorts. 
In developing diagnoses, and in compiling such 
diagnoses into clinical records, clinicians seek a 
representation of salient particulars (diseases, disease 
processes, drug effects) on the side of their patients. 
Drawing on their theoretical understanding of the 
universals which these particulars instantiate (which 
in turn draws on prior representations formed in 
relation to earlier particulars19), they first develop a 
cognitive representation of what is taking place within 
a given collection of particulars in reality, which they 
then transform into representational artifacts such as 
clinical documents, entries in databases, and so forth, 
which may then foster more refined cognitive 
representations in the future. 
The mentioned representations are typically built 
up out of sub-representations each of which, in the 
best case, mirrors a corresponding salient portion of 
reality. The most simple representations (‘blood! ’) 
mirror universals or particulars taken singly; more 
complex representations – such as therapeutic 
schemas, diagnostic protocols, scientific texts, 
pathway diagrams – mirror more complex portions of 
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reality, their constituent sub-representations being 
joined together in ways designed to mirror salient 
relations on the side of reality.  
In the ideal case a representation would be such 
that all portions of reality salient to the purposes for 
which it was constructed would have exactly one 
corresponding unit in the representation, and every 
unit in the representation would correspond to exactly 
one salient portion of reality.19 Unfortunately, in a 
domain like biomedicine, ideal case will likely remain 
forever beyond our grasp. Researchers working on 
the level of universals may fall short by creating 
representations which either (i) fail to include general 
terms for universals which are salient to their domain, 
or (ii) include general terms which do not in fact 
denote any universals at all. Similarly, clinicians 
working on the level of particulars may fall short of 
the best case by creating misdiagnoses, either (i) by 
failing to acknowledge particulars which do exist and 
which are salient to the health of a given patient, or 
(ii) by using representational units assumed to refer to 
particulars where no such particulars exist. 
A TAXONOMY is a tree-form graph-theoretic 
representational artifact with nodes representing 
universals or classes and edges representing is_a or 
subset relations. 
An ONTOLOGY is a representational artifact, 
comprising a taxonomy as proper part, whose 
representational units are intended to designate some 
combination of universals, defined classes, and 
certain relations between them.13  
A REALISM-BASED ONTOLOGY is built out of terms 
which are intended to refer exclusively to universals, 
and corresponds to that part of the content of a 
scientific theory that is captured by its constituent 
general terms and their interrelations.  
A TERMINOLOGY is a representational artifact 
consisting of representational units which are the 
general terms of some natural language used to refer 
to entities in some specific domain.  
An INVENTORY is a representational artifact built 
out of singular referring terms such as proper names 
or alphanumeric identifiers. Electronic Health 
Records (EHRs) incorporate inventories in this sense, 
including both terms denoting particulars (‘patient 
#347’, ‘lung #420’) and more complex expressions 
involving terms designating universals and defined 
classes (‘the history of cancer in patient #347’s 
family’).20 
In the best case, again, each of the representational 
artifacts listed above (ontologies, taxonomies, 
inventories) will be such that its representational units 
stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the salient 
entities in its domain. In practice, however, such 
artifacts can be classified on the basis of the various 
ways in which they fall short of this best case, in 
terms of properties such as correctness, degree of 
structural fit, degree of completeness and degree of 
redundancy.16,18 By exploiting such classifications we 
can measure the quality improvements made in 
successive versions, and also use such measures as a 
basis for further improvement.20  
To make a representation interpretable by a 
computer, it must be published in a language with a 
formal semantics and so converted into a 
FORMALIZED REPRESENTATION. The choice of 
language will depend on the complexity of what one 
needs to express and on the sorts of reasoning one 
needs to perform. While OWL, for example, can cope 
well with defined classes, it may not have sufficient 
expressive power to meet the needs of ontologies in 
the life sciences domain. Thus it seems to be 
incapable, for example, of capturing the relations 
involved even in simple interactions among pluralities 
of continuants, or of capturing the changes which take 
place in such continuants (for example growth of a 
tumor) over time.21,22 
Most inventories in the biomedical field (including 
most EHRs) have still exploited hardly at all the 
powers of formal reasoning. The paradigm of 
Referent Tracking represents an exception to this 
rule,20 since it involves precisely the embedding of a 
highly structured representation of particulars in a 
formalized representation of the corresponding 
universals. 
THE CONCEPT ORIENTATION 
We believe that ontologies, inventories and similar 
artifacts should consist exclusively of representational 
units which are intended to designate entities in Level 
1 reality. Defenders of the concept orientation in 
medical terminology development have offered a 
series of arguments against this view, to the effect 
that such terminologies should include also (or 
exclusively) representational units referring to what 
are called ‘concepts’.23 
First, is what we can call the argument from 
intellectual modesty, which asserts that it is up to 
domain experts, and not to terminology developers, to 
answer for the truth of whatever theories the 
terminology is intended to mirror. Since domain 
experts themselves disagree, a terminology should 
embrace no claims as to what the world is like, but 
reflect, rather, the coagulate formed out of the 
concepts used by different experts.  
Against this, it can be pointed out that communities 
working on common domains in the medical as in 
other scientific fields in fact accept a massive and 
ever-growing body of consensus truths about the 
entities in these domains. Many of these truths are, 
admittedly, of a trivial sort (that mammals have 
hearts, that organisms are made of cells), but it is 
precisely such truths which form the core of science-
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based ontologues. Where conflicts do arise in the 
course of scientific development, these are highly 
localized, and pertain to specific mechanisms, for 
example of drug action or disease development, 
which can serve as the targets of conflicting beliefs 
only because researchers share a huge body of 
presuppositions.  
We can think of no scenario under which it would 
make sense to postulate special entities called 
‘concepts’ as the entities to which terms subject to 
scientific dispute would refer. For either, for any such 
term, the dispute is resolved in its favor, and then it is 
the corresponding level 1 entity that has served as its 
referent all along; or it is established that the term in 
question is non-designating, and then this term is no 
longer a candidate for inclusion in a terminology. We 
cannot solve the problem that we do not know, at 
some given stage of scientific inquiry, to which of 
these groups a given term belongs, by providing such 
terms instead with guaranteed referents called 
‘concepts’. It may, finally, be the case that it is not the 
disputed term itself which is at issue, but rather some 
more complex expression, as when we talk about ‘G. 
E. Stahl’s concept of phlogiston’, but that the latter 
refers to some entity – a concept – in (psychological) 
reality is precisely not subject to scientific dispute.  
Sometimes the argument from intellectual modesty 
takes an extreme form, for example on the part of 
those for whom reality itself is seen as being 
somehow unknowable (‘we can only ever know our 
own concepts’). Arguments along these lines are of 
course familiar from the history of philosophy. Stove 
provides the definitive refutation.24 Here we need note 
only that they run counter not just to the successes, 
but to the very existence, of science and technology 
as collaborative endeavors.  
Second, is the argument from creativity. Designer 
drugs are conceived, modeled, and described long 
before they are successfully synthesized, and the 
plans of pharmaceutical companies may contain 
putative references to the corresponding chemical 
universals long before there are instances in reality. 
But again: such descriptions and plans can be 
perfectly well apprehended even within terminologies 
and ontologies conceived as relating exclusively to 
what is real. Descriptions and plans do, after all, 
exist. On the other hand it would be an error to 
include in a scientific ontology of drugs terms 
referring to pharmaceutical products which do not yet 
(and may never) exist, solely on the basis of plans and 
descriptions. Rather, such terms should be included 
precisely at the point where the corresponding 
instances do indeed exist in reality, exactly in 
accordance with our proposals above. 
Third, is what we might call the argument from 
unicorns. Some of the terms needed in medical 
terminologies refer, it is held, to what does not exist. 
Some patients do, after all, believe that they are 
James Bond, or that they see unicorns. The realist 
approach is however perfectly well able to 
comprehend also phenomena such as these, even 
though it is restricted to the representation of what is 
real. For the beliefs and hallucinatory episodes in 
question are of course as real as are the persons who 
suffer (or enjoy) them. And certainly such beliefs and 
episodes may involve concepts (in the properly 
psychological sense of this term). But they are not 
about concepts, they do not have concepts as their 
targets – for they are intended by their subjects to be 
about entities in flesh-and-blood external reality. 
Fourth, is the argument from medical history. The 
history of medicine is a scientific pursuit; yet it 
involves use of terms such as ‘diabolic possession’ 
which, according to the best current science, do not 
refer to universals in reality. But again: the history of 
medicine has as its subject-domain precisely the 
beliefs, both true and false, of former generations 
(together with the practices, institutions, etc. 
associated therewith). Thus a term like ‘diabolic 
possession’ should be included in the ontology of this 
discipline in the first place as component part of 
terms designating corresponding classes of beliefs. In 
addition it may appear also as part of a term 
designating some fiat collection of those diseases 
from which the patients diagnosed as being possessed 
were in fact suffering. The evolution of our thinking 
about disease can then be understood in the same way 
that we deal with theory change in other parts of 
science, as a reordering of our beliefs about the 
ontological validity and salience of specific families 
of terms – and once again: concepts themselves play 
no role as referents.20,26 
Fifth, is the argument from syndromes. The 
subject-matters of biology and medicine are, it is 
held, replete with entities which do not exist in reality 
but are rather convenient abstractions. A syndrome 
such as congestive heart failure, for example, is 
nothing more than a convenient abstraction, used for 
the convenience of physicians to collect together 
many disparate and unrelated diseases which have 
common final manifestations. Such abstractions are, it 
is held, mere concepts.  
According to the considerations on fiat 
demarcations advanced above, however, syndromes, 
pathways, genetic networks and similar phenomena 
are indeed fully real – though their reality is that of 
defined (fiat) classes rather than of universals. A 
similar response can be given also in regard to the 
many human-dependent delineations used in 
expressions like ‘obesity’ or ‘hypertension’ or 
‘abnormal curvature of spine’. These terms, too, refer 
to entities in reality, namely to defined classes which 
rest on fiat thresholds established by consensus 
among physicians. 
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Sixth is the argument from error. When erroneous 
entries are entered into a clinical record and inter-
preted as being about level 1 entities, then logical 
conflicts can arise. For Rector et al., this implies that 
the use of a meta-language should be made compul-
sory for all statements in the EHR, which should be, 
not about entities in reality, but rather about what are 
called ‘findings’.25 Instead of p and not p, the record 
would contain entries like: McX observed p and O’W 
observed not p, so that logical contradiction is 
avoided. The terms in terminologies devised to serve 
such EHRs would then one and all refer not to 
diseases themselves, but rather to mere ‘concepts’ of 
diseases. This, however, blurs the distinction between 
entities in reality and associated findings, and opens 
the door to the inclusion in a terminology of 
problematic findings-related expressions such as 
SNOMED’s ‘absent nipple’, ‘absent leg’, etc. 
Certainly clinicians need to record such findings. But 
then their findings are precisely that a leg is absent; 
not that a special kind of (‘absent’) leg is present. 
In the domain of scientific research we do not 
embargo entirely the making of object-language 
assertions simply because there might be, among the 
totality of such assertions, some which are erroneous. 
Rather, we rely on the normal workings of science as 
a collective, empirical endeavor to weed out error 
over time, providing facilities to quarantine erroneous 
entries and resolve logical conflicts as they are 
identified. We have argued elsewhere that these same 
devices can be applied also in the medical context.26 
The argument for the move to the meta-level is 
sometimes buttressed by appeal to medico-legal 
considerations seen as requiring that the EHR be a 
record not of what exists but of clinicians’ beliefs and 
actions. Yet the forensic purposes of an audit trail can 
equally well be served by an object-language record 
if we ensure that meta-data are associated with each 
entry identifying by whom the pertinent data were 
entered, at what time, and so forth. 
On the other side, moreover, even the move to 
meta-level assertions would not in fact solve the 
problems of error, logical contradiction and legal 
liability. For the very same problems arise not only 
when human beings are describing, on the object-
level, fractures, or pulse rates, or symptoms of 
coughing or swelling, but also on the meta-level when 
they are describing what clinicians have heard, seen, 
thought and done. The latter, too, are subject to error, 
fraud, and disagreement in interpretation. 
Seventh is the argument from borderline cases. As 
we have already noted above, there is at any given 
stage no bright line between those general terms 
properly to be conceived as designating universals 
and those designating merely ‘concepts’ (or defined 
classes). Certainly there are, at any given stage in the 
development of science, clear cases on either side: 
‘electron’ or ‘cell’, on the one hand, and ‘fall on stairs 
or ladders in water transport NOS, occupant of small 
unpowered boat injured’ (Read Codes) on the other. 
But there are also borderline cases such as ‘alcoholic 
non-smoker with diabetes’, or ‘age-dependent yeast 
cell size increase’, which call into question the very 
basis of the distinction. 
In response, we note first the general point, that 
arguments from the existence of borderline cases in 
general have very little force. For otherwise they 
would allow us to prove from the existence of people 
with borderline complements of hair that there is no 
such thing as baldness or hairiness. 
As to the specific problem of how to classify 
borderline expressions, this is a problem not for 
terminology, but rather for empirical science. For 
borderline terms of the sorts mentioned will, as an 
inevitable concomitant of scientific advance, be in 
any case subjected to a filtering process based on 
whether they are needed for purposes of (for example 
therapeutically) fruitful classifications, and thus for 
the expression of scientific laws.  
Science itself is thereby subject to constant update. 
A term taken to refer to a universal by one generation 
of scientists may be demoted to the level of non-
designating term (‘phlogiston’) by the next. This 
means also that representational artifacts of the sorts 
considered in the above, because they form an 
integral part of the practice of science, should 
themselves be subject to continual update in light of 
such advance. But again: we can think of no 
circumstance in which updating of the sort in question 
would signify that phlogiston is itself a concept, or 
that some expression was at one or other stage being 
used by scientists with the intention of referring to 
‘concepts’ rather than to entities in reality. 
THE SEMIOTIC TRIANGLE 
Finally is what we might call the argument from 
multiple perspectives. Different patients, clinicians 
and biologists have their own perspectives on one and 
the same reality. To do justice to these differences, it 
is argued, we must hold that their respective 
representations point, not to this common reality, but 
rather to their different ‘concepts’ thereof.  
This argument has its roots in the work of Ogden 
and Richards, and specifically in their discussion of 
the so-called ‘semiotic triangle’, which is of 
importance not least because it embodies a view of 
meaning and reference that still plays a fateful role in 
the terminology standardization work of ISO.26 
As Figure 1 makes clear, the triangle in fact refers 
not to ‘concepts’, but rather to what its authors call 
‘thought or reference’,27 reflecting the fact that Ogden 
and Richards’ account is rooted in a theory of 
psychological causality. When we experience a 
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certain object in association with a certain sign, then 
memory traces are laid down in our brains in virtue of 
which the mere appearance of the same sign in the 
future will, they hold, ‘evoke’ a ‘thought or reference’ 
directed towards this object through the reactivation 
of impressions stored in memory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two solid edges of the triangle are intended to 
represent what are held to be causal relations of 
‘symbolization’ (roughly: evocation), and ‘reference’ 
(roughly: perception or memory) on the part of a 
symbol-using subject. The dashed edge, in contrast, 
signifies that the relation between term and referent – 
the relation that is most important for the discussion 
of terminology – is merely ‘imputed’. 
The background assumption here is that multiple 
perspectives are both ubiquitous and (at best) only 
locally and transiently resolvable. The meanings 
words have for you or me depend on our past 
experiences of uses of these words in different kinds 
of contexts. Ambiguity must be resolved anew (and a 
new ‘imputed’ relation of reference spawned) on each 
successive occasion of use. From this, Ogden and 
Richards infer that a symbolic representation can 
never refer directly to an object, but rather only 
indirectly, via a ‘thought or reference’ within the 
mind.  
It is a depsychologized version of this latter thesis 
which forms the basis of the concept orientation in 
contemporary terminology research. The terms in 
terminologies refer not to entities in reality, it is held, 
but  rather to ‘concepts’ in a special ‘realm’. The lat-
ter are not transparent mediators of reference; rather 
they are its targets, and the job of the terminologist is 
to callibrate his list of terms in relation not to reality 
but to this special ‘realm of concepts’.26 
The relation between terms in a terminology and 
the reality beyond becomes hereby obscured. Reality 
exists, if at all, only behind a conceptual veil – and 
hence familiar confusions according to which for 
example the concept of bacteria would cause an 
experimental model of disease, or the concept of 
vitamin would be ‘essential in the diet of man’.28 
‘CONCEPTS’ AND ‘MODELS’ 
How, then, should ‘concept’ be properly treated in the 
terminology literature henceforth? There are of 
course sensible uses of this term, for example in the 
literature of psychology. In the terminology literature, 
however, ‘concept’ has been used in such a 
bewildering variety of confused and confusing ways 
that we recommend that it be avoided altogether. 
It is tempting to suppose that, when considered 
extensionally, all of the mentioned alternative 
readings come down to one and the same thing, 
namely to an identification of ‘concept’ with what we 
have earlier called ‘defined class’. If ‘concept’ could 
be used systematically in this way in terminological 
circles, then this would, indeed, constitute progress of 
sorts, though the question would then arise why 
‘defined class’ itself should not be used instead. 
Unfortunately, however, the proposal in question 
stands in conflict with the fact that ‘concept’ is used 
by its adherents to comprehend also putative referents 
even for terms – such as ‘surgical procedure not 
carried out because of patient’s decision’ – which do 
not designate defined classes because they designate 
nothing at all. Here again, we believe, a proper 
treatment would involve appeal to appropriate fiat 
classes, defined in terms of utterances, interrupted 
plans, expectations, etc. on the part of the subjects 
involved.  
What, now is to be said of terms such as ‘concept 
model’, ‘knowledge representation’, ‘information 
model’, and so forth referred to in our premble 
above? To the extent that concept-based 
terminological artifacts consist in representations not 
of the reality on the side of the patient but rather of 
the entities in some putative ‘realm of concepts’, the 
term ‘concept model’ may be justified. This term is 
indeed used by SNOMED CT in its own self-
descriptions, though given SNOMED’s scientific 
goals, we believe that, on the basis of the arguments 
given above, it should be abandoned. Still more 
problematic is the term ‘knowledge model’ or 
‘knowledge representation’ (GALEN). For in the 
absence of a reference to reality to serve as 
benchmark, what could motivate a distinction 
between knowledge and mere belief.19 And what, in 
the absence of a reference to reality, could motivate 
adding or deleting terms in successive versions of a 
terminology, if every term is in any case guaranteed a 
reference to its own specially tailored ‘concept’. 
As to ‘information model’, here one standard 
uncertainty concerns the relation between an entity in 
reality and the body of information used to ‘repre-
sent’ this entity in some information system. Is it in-
formation which is being ‘modeled’ in an information 
model, or the reality which this information is about? 
The documentation of the HL7 Reference 
Information Model (RIM)29 adds extra layers of 
uncertainty by conceiving its principal formulas as 
referring to the acts in which entities are observed for 
Figure 1 – Ogden and Richards’ Semiotic Triangle
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example in a clinical context. Simultaneously, 
however, it conceives these formulas as referring also 
to the documentation of such acts for example in an 
information system. The apparent contradiction is to 
some degree resolved by the RIM on the basis of its 
assertion that there is in any case ‘no distinction 
between an activity and its documentation’.30 
CONCLUSION 
Drawing on our distinction of the three levels of 
reality, cognition and representational artifact we 
have sought to formulate an unambiguous 
terminology for describing ontologies and related 
artifacts. The proposed terminology allows us to 
characterize more precisely the sorts of things which 
go wrong when the distinction between these levels is 
ignored, or when one or other level is denied, so that 
the approach may also help in improving such 
artifacts in the future. 
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